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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

the statute by a motion to make more definite and certain. This goes
upon the theory that causes of action are joinable, and can b e properly pleaded in one complaint. On the other hand, where they are
nonjoinable, they have no proper place in the complaint at all, and
cannot be united, either in separate counts or in a jumble in one count.
It is therefore considered that -the statute requiring a motion to make
more definite and certain was intended for an intermingling of nonjoinable causes of action in one count, leaving an intermingling of nonjoinable causes of action in one count subject to the statutory provision which authorizes a demurrer where two or more causes of action
are improperly united. This distinction is manifested to a degree in
the decisions of this court, and seems to be the uniform rule in other
jurisdictions.
A defect in joining causes of action in one count may be reached by
a motion to make more certain by separately stating and numbering
where causes are joinable, but where there are nonjoinable causes of
action which cannot be united in the complaint, either in separate or
in single counts; such a complaint is demurrable and it is not necessary
to make a motion to separately state and number before demurring.
The court follows the case of Fischer vs. Hintz, 145 Minn. 161, 176
N. W. 177, which holds that defendants may demur for misjoinder,
though the pleading in form sets forth but one cause of action, if in
reality it embraces two or more that cannot be joined in any form.1
An examination of the authorities upon -the subject in this state discloses that in Buerger vs. Buerger, 178 Wis. 352, i9o N. W. 126, and
July vs. Adams, 178 Wis. 375, i9 o N. W. 89, and McIntyre vs. Carroll,
193 Wis. 382, 214 N. W. 366, language is used based, however, upon
the respective issues in these cases, which does not distinguish between
joinable and nonjoinable causes of action.
After due and careful consideration, the court is of the opinion that
a distinction between joinable and nonjoinable causes of action should
be definitely recognized. By so doing the court will be in harmony
with the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
GERALD

F.

HARDY

Statute of Frauds; Extrinsic Evidence in Relation to Description
In Pierson vs. Dorff,-Wis.-, 223 N. W. 579, the validity of an
agreement for the sale of real estate was questioned on the ground that
the description of the property did not comply with the Statute of
1

Poneroy's Code Remedies, sec. 344; Bass v. Upton, I Minn. 408 (Gil. 292) ;

Anderson v. Scandia Bank, 53 Minn. 191, 54 N.W. lO62; Goldberg v. Utley, 6o

N.Y. 427; Leidersdorf v. Second Ward Bank, 50 Wis. 406, 7 N.W. 3o6; Mulholland v. Rapp, 5o Mo. 42.

NOTES AND COMMENT

Frauds (St. 1927, Sec. 240.o6). The description of the property which
was to be conveyed was as follows: "The building which is now under
construction, consisting of four (4) stores, situated oil Oakland Avenue in Shorewood, County of Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin." There
was oral evidence that the plaintiffs took possession of the property,
placed "For Rent" signs in the windows, and advertised the stores for
rent in a newspaper. There was testimony to the effect that plaintiffs
were furnished with an abstract of title to the real estate, and that
they delivered it to their attorney for examination.
The court was of the opinion that the contract was valid and not
subject to these objections: First, that it is impossible to ascertain the
property from the face of the description; and second, that even if oral
testimony was admissible, still after the introduction of such oral testimony the description remained as indefinite as ever.
Some courts take the position that the description must in itself be
expressed with such certainty that the exact location of the property
can be ascertained from the face of the agreement.' It has been held
that the memorandum must contain a description sufficient to readily
2
identify the property without resort to extrinsic evidence.
The majority view is that oral evidence may be introduced to identify
the land and that the description need only furnish the means of location.

3

In the case of Pierson vs. Dorff, supra, the court virtually added
the subsequent acts of the parties to the language used in the contract
of sale. Taken by itself the agreement was insufficient in its description. Viewed, however, in the light of extrinsic circumstances the
description was sufficiently definite to satisfy the operation of the
statute of frauds.
It is undeniable that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted a
liberal attitude in giving expression to the legislative intent embodied
in Section 240.06. In Gifford vs. Straub, 172 Wis. 396, the words "my
place" and in Brown vs. Marty, 172 Wis. 411, the words, "property
owned by first party" were held sufficient to allow parol evidence to
identify the land in question.
'Chambers v. Murphy, 192 Ky. 839 234 S.W. 96o; Rosen v. Phelps, (Tex. Civ.
App.),
16o S.W. lO4.
2

Hines v. Copeland, 23 Cal. App. 36, x36 Pac. 728; Shamon v. Wisdom, 171

Ala. 409, 55 So. lO2; Kentucky Counties Oil Co. v. Cupler, 2o4 Ky. 799, 265

S.W. 334.
'Desmarais v. Taft, 21o Mass. 560, 97 N.E. 96; Gilbert v. Tre"Iblay, 79 N.H.
43i, I11 At. 314; Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515, I So. 149; Hodges v. Knowing,

58 Conn. 12, 18 Atl. 979; Daniels v. Rogers, io8 App. Div. 338, 96 N.Y. Suppl.
642; Boon v. Pierpont, 28 N.J. Eq. 7; Ranney v. Byers, 219 Pa. 332, 68 Atl.
971, Baxter v. Calhoun, 222 Fed. iii; Baker v. Hall, 158 Mass. 361, 33 N.E. 612.
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The rule permitting the introduction of evidence to establish the certainty of a description has also been quite liberally applied in other
jurisdictions. Oral evidence was allowed to make definite the following
indefinite descriptions:
'4 ;"'eighty acres of land
"Twenty-four acres of land at TIY miles N. of Merwin, Bates County, Mo."-; "the house known and
Thirty-Second Street"8 ; "my fifteen-acre
numbered as No.
farm, located one mile north of W. M. County, Oregon" ; "my forty
near the garrison lands in H. County" 8 ; "Fleming farm on French
Creek" 9 ; and "H's place at S."''
To satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds it is not necessary that the property be described with such definiteness and certainty
that the court must be able to tell from an inspection of the memorandum itself the exact location of the premises without the aid of extrinsic evidence. There might be some question as to whethqrr or not oral
proof as to the acts, conduct, or declarations of the parties concerned,
or other extrinsic circumstances does not violate the rule that parol
"Plant v. Bourne, 98 Mass. 545.
'Tracy v. Berridge, 18o Mo. App.

220,

167 S.W. 1176.

*Btdkley v. Devine, 127 Ill. 406, 20 N.E. 16.
7
Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 Pac. 673.
'Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515; I So. 149.
'Ross v. Baker, 72 Pa. x86, I86.
"0Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 AtI. 979.
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evidence cannot be given to add to a written contract. It is to be remembered, however, that seldom can one tell from a mere examination
of the face of the instrument the exact location of the property, without
resort to extrinsic evidence. A liberal attitude in admitting parol proof
certainly helps to place the court in the position of the parties at the
time of the making of the agreement and thereby enables it to intelligently interpret the contract.
BERNARD SOREF

Taxation; Constitutional Law
A decision of far reaching importance was recently handed down
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court." It is a decision not only of interest
to the bar, but also to every person who is in anyway interested in the
distribution of merchandise. It effects every wholesaler and every
retailer in the state of Wisconsin. It is welcomed by every manufacturer outside of the state who looks to Wisconsin as a field of distribution for his product. And more directly it has lulled into security an
industry in which millions of dollars are invested, namely public warehousing.
The case was in the form of declaratory relief asking for judicial
construction of subdivision 7 of Section 70.13:
Merchandise placed in storage in the original package in a commercial storage warehouse shall while so in storage be considered in
transit and not subject to taxation.
Before the passage of this section in 1927, the situation was indeed
far from satisfactory. Not only were goods, shipped from outside the
state, taxable but such tax had to be paid by the warehouseman if the
gods were in his possession on the taxing date, May i. The warehouseman was expected to collect the taxes paid from the consignees.
But here he was given the choice of either paying the tax himself or
relinquishing the: business to warehouses outside the state where there
was no property tax. This was an obvious hardship to the warehouseman. It also prevented the free dissemination of goods into the state,
2
thus depriving the Wisconsin merchant of the benefits to be derived.
With a view toward remedying this situation the legislature passed
the above quoted section. That this section does not apply to goods
which are at all times within the state, though warehoused, is pointed
out by the court in the light of other sections passed by the same legislature. Sec. 70.205 expressly provides for the taxation of intrAstate
property stored in warehouses. Subsection of section 70.13 provides

"Nash Sales v.
2

City of Milwaukee, 224 N.W. 126.
State ex rel Bloch Bros. v. Tiesberg, 220 N.W. 217.

